



政府土地工程測量員協會

Association of Government Land & Engineering Surveying Officers

通訊地址：
香港灣仔軒尼詩道 130 號
修頓中心 18 樓

Correspondence Address :
18/F, Southorn Centre, 130 Hennessy Road, 傳 真：2838 8170
Wan Chai, Hong Kong.

電郵：agleso@yahoo.com.hk
agleso@sinatown.com
網頁：http://agleso.sinatown.com

通告編號：05 / 2011

Working group on SSO(L)s' participation in SO(L) staff appraisal report writing

本會應 AD/SM 邀請，派出代表出席 2011 年 3 月 10 日標題所述的工作小組第二次會議。工作小組由 AD/SM 主持，成員包括本會代表、政府本地土地測量師協會代表、CLS/HQ、CLS/NT、SLS/ K & Kai Tak、SMO 委任的 SSO(L)及 PSO(L)代表，SEO/SMO 出任秘書。

工作小組背景

本會曾獲邀出席 2010 年 11 月 25 日舉行的第一次工作會議，但經執委會討論後，議決婉拒委派代表出席，及後在 12 月與 DD/SM 的例行會議上，DD/SM 懇切期盼本會考慮委派代表出席標題小組會議，給予意見供作考慮。故此第一次工作會議遂順延至 2011 年 1 月 11 日，但因本會李學文、趙健文及郭華良在 2010 年 12 月 28 日至 1 月 10 日參加國家行政學院舉辦的國情研習班及休假，並不知悉第一次工作會議的會期，故此沒有出席。

出席工作小組第二次會議

因測繪處總部在 2011 年 1 月 21 日發出行政通告 No.06 後，在會員同事間產生極大的疑慮及憂心，向本會反映，本會認為有必要借此機會表達立場及釐清一些條文的含意，故出席是次工作小組會議，簡報如下。

本會在會議中指出：

- 1) 根據地政總署行政通告第 4/09 號 附件二的規定，SO(L)的評核人定為 PSO(L)/LS，而撰寫評核報告只是「工作表現管理」的其中一個組成部分。
- 2) 本會原則上不反對評核人作一縱深層次向與受評人共事的同事收集工作表現意見。此做法亦符合公務員事務局通告第 10/2009 號通告的基本要求-如實、公平、客觀和準確。
- 3) 「工作計劃和目標」是評核人及受評人在評核週期開始時議定的，有個別單位領導，不知是有意或無意還是語文能力出現障礙，給予一份 SO(L)的評核報告予 SSO(L)，強行要求 SSO(L)按指示撰寫 SO(L)的評核報告擬稿，實有違 CSB 通告第 10/2009 號通告的精髓及原意。此做法實無助完善有關當局所倡議的公平、公開、公正的「工作表現管理制度」，只會越描越黑，挑起管職雙方沒完沒了的爭拗，將和諧的管職關係，推向深淵，萬劫不復。

- 4) 評核人應持開放態度，持勢凌人的高壓手法去收集受評人的工作表現意見，肯定不會達到良好效果。自 2003 年自願離職計劃推出後，本職系有大量職位被刪減。但反觀過去數年，專業土地測量師職位(公務員/非公務員)都大幅增加約 30%。職位增加卻推卸職責，實令很多 SSO(L)氣憤難平，如強行要求 SSO(L)即時撰寫 SO(L)的評核報告，本會將號召會員起來抗爭。本職系設立四十多年，管方在不同場合反覆強調現時的工作表現管理機制沿用多時，評核方式亦建基在客觀及實事求是的基礎上反映，行之有效，故此本會希望小組主席在原有的基礎上全盤考慮同事意見。
- 5) 在會議上，AD/SM 及 CLS/NT 申明：在 RSSM 的會議上，沒有指令評核人在撰寫 SO(L)的獨立評核報告時，以懲處為後盾，威迫 SSO(L)提交 SO(L)的評核報告擬稿。個別事件只是個別評核人的誤解，如果仍然不瞭解行政通告 No.06 的原意，可以要求 SLS/HRM 協助。再者，AD/SM 亦接納 SSO(L)在回認 SO(L)的評核人要求提供意見或觀點時，可以是沒有意見或觀點。

如會員同事在被要求提供 SO(L)工作表現意見時感到壓力，可效法例如附件撰寫評核報告的方式。如對新考績報告安排有建議，可電郵或致電本人或各執委反映，多謝各會員同事支持。

主席 李學文

2011 年 3 月 28 日

附件：Page 241 of “Government Capacity And The Hong Kong Civil Service” (by John P. Burns)

Box 7.4 Performance Management in the Customs and Excise Department

One Customs and Excise Department official pointed out: 'Deep in my heart, in order to save trouble I usually give them [subordinates inside the 'promotion zone'] 'A' [outstanding] reports. First of all, an 'A' report costs me nothing. In return, I can ask my subordinates to behave properly so that I can maintain discipline and cooperation from them. . . . In order to maintain a harmonious relationship with subordinates, we prefer to give an outstanding report to officers in the 'promotion zone' (p. 21).

In the words of another officer: 'Do you think we can still expect anything from a prisoner, who has been sentenced to death and waiting to be executed [an officer who has no hope of promotion]? Don't forget that in the Department avoiding troubles is always the main concern of all managers. So, why not just give an 'A' report to them? It will do both of us good. Remember if your men behave badly and create troubles, your boss will label you as a bad supervisor as well. The boss's reasoning is everyone else is okay except you, so you must be a bad leader. Remember that no one likes problems and troubles' (p. 24).

A member of a promotion board stated: 'If you look at the reports, all the candidates are supermen and they have no weaknesses at all. Their reports are full of "A"s. How can I actually tell who is good and who is not? It is almost an impossible task for the members' (p. 38).

According to one view in the Department 'When they first join the C&E, officers want to do something and achieve something. However, as time goes by, they learn that having a good relationship with your bosses, instead of excellent performance, is the quickest way to promotion. After they have been promoted, they tend to 'shoe-shine' more because they know for sure this is the way to be successful. It is very hard to change their perceptions. Some will even teach the new comers that 'shoe-shining' is the best way to get rewards, not good performance or commitment [as mentioned by 'human resource management' theories]' (p. 87).

Source: Kwok Kai Chiu, Jim, 'The Performance Management System of the Customs and Excise Department' (unpublished MPA dissertation, the University of Hong Kong, 1997), based on interviews carried out in the Customs and Excise Department in 1996-7 (N=63).

There isn't any effect on motivation whether I rate them good or bad [and it becomes] a paperwork exercise.⁸²

Finally, in Hong Kong as elsewhere, there have been occasional reports of abuse of the performance appraisal process. In 1994, for example, a police inspector was jailed for three months for accepting ten karaoke laser discs from his subordinate in return for 'writing a favourable appraisal report'.⁸³ And in 2000, a police sergeant was charged for asking a police constable to provide him with a Hong Kong Jockey Club telebet account and betting money in exchange for writing a favourable appraisal.⁸⁴ These cases, both from the police, are very rare, however.

In its 1999 Consultative Document, the Civil Service Bureau pointed out: 'Reform of the performance appraisal culture and standardization of grading is also necessary.'⁸⁵ Authorities recommended 'indicative benchmarking' or 'forced choice', which some departments had already begun to experiment with.⁸⁶ Since late 1998, for example, the engineering grade has implemented 'forced choice' (see Box 7.5), apparently with